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CHAPTER 19 
Sex and Marriage in the Protestant Tradition, 1500-1900 
John Witte, Jr.1 
 
Abstract 
This Article analyzes the mainline Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican models of 
sex, marriage, and family and their gradual liberalization by Enlightenment 
liberalism.  The theological differences between these models can be traced to their 
grounding in Lutheran two kingdoms doctrines, Calvinist covenantal theology, 
Anglican commonwealth theory, and Enlightenment contractarian logic.  Lutherans 
consigned primary marital jurisdiction to the territorial prince or urban council.  
Calvinists assigned interlocking marital roles to local consistories and city councils.  
Anglicans left marital jurisdiction to church courts, subject to state oversight and 
legislation.  The early Enlightenment philosophers, many of them Protestants, 
pressed for a sharper separation of church and state in the governance of marriage, 
and for stronger protections of the rights and equality of women and children within 
and beyond the marital household.  But they maintained traditional Protestant 
prohibitions extramarital sex and no-fault divorce in an effort to protect especially 
women and children from exploitation. Later  
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Sex, marriage, and family life were hotly contested issues during the 16th-
century Protestant Reformation and one of the first institutions to be reformed. The 
leading Protestant theologians of the 16th century all prepared lengthy tracts on the 
subject, and scores of leading Protestant jurists worked together to develop a new 
family law for Protestant lands. Virtually every city and territory on the Continent that 
converted to the Protestant cause in the first half of the 16th century had new 
marriage laws on the books within a decade after accepting the Reformation.  And, it 
was King Henry VIII’s ‘great marriage affair’ with Catherine that prompted the 
English break with Rome. 
The Protestant reformers’ early preoccupation with marriage was partly driven 
by their critique of the Roman Catholic sacramental theology and canon law of 
marriage that had dominated the West for the prior half millennium. The medieval 
Church’s expansive jurisdiction over marriage was, for Protestants, a usurpation of 
the state’s authority. The sacramental concept of marriage on which the Church 
predicated its jurisdiction was for the reformers a self-serving theological fiction. The 
canonical prohibition on marriage of clergy and monastics ignored the Bible’s 
warnings against sexual sin as the reformers understood them.  The church’s 
intricate rules governing sexual desire and expression, even within marriage, were 
seen as a gratuitous insult to God’s gift of marital love. The canon law’s many 
impediments to engagement and marriage and its prohibitions against complete 
divorce and remarriage stood in considerable tension with the Protestant 
understanding of the natural and biblical right and duty of each fit adult to marry.   
Many Protestant theological leaders acted on these new teachings about 
sexuality and marriage in the first decades of the Reformation. The first Protestant 
clergy were mostly ex-priests or ex-monastics who had forsaken their orders and 
vows, and married shortly thereafter. New Protestant converts followed their 
examples by marrying, divorcing, and remarrying in open contempt of canon law 
rules. A few early Anabaptists even experimented with polygamy.2 As Catholic 
Church courts and their secular counterparts firmly punished these flagrant sex 
crimes, Protestant theologians and jurists rose to the defence of their coreligionists, 
producing a new Protestant gospel of marital and sexual freedom.  
Political leaders rapidly translated this new Protestant gospel into new civil 
laws in place of the Catholic Church’s canon laws. Viewed together, these new state 
laws (1) shifted marital jurisdiction from the church to the state; (2) abolished 
monasteries and convents; (3) commended, if not commanded, the marriage of 
clergy; (4) rejected the sacramentality of marriage and the religious tests traditionally 
required for valid unions; (5) banned secret marriages and required the participation 
of parents, peers, priests, and political officials in marriage formation; (6) sharply 
curtailed the number of impediments used to annul engagements and marriages; 
and (7) introduced fault-based complete divorce with a subsequent right for 
divorcees to remarry. The Western legal tradition would not see such sweeping 
reforms of its marital laws again until the liberal, cultural and constitutional reforms of 
the last half century.    
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Mainline Protestant Models of Sex and Marriage 
Mainline Protestants – Lutherans, Calvinists, and Anglicans – all started their 
marital teachings with the Bible.  For them, Genesis 1 and 2 were axiomatic 
statements of the created order and natural law of marriage.  God had created 
marriage as a ‘two-in-one-flesh union’ between a man and a woman designed for 
them to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ and to be protected from sexual sin.  Also axiomatic 
was the Decalogue that commanded children to ‘honour’ their parents, and spouses 
to avoid adultery or even ‘coveting’ their neighbour’s wife or maidservants.  
Instructive, too, were the intricate Mosaic laws on sex, marriage, and family life, 
which the Hebrew Prophets wove into a robust ethic of enduring and exclusive 
monogamous marriage modelled on Yahweh’s covenantal love for his elect people.   
From Matthew 19 and Romans 7, Protestants drew the lessons that a lawful 
Christian marriage should not be ‘rent asunder’ too easily and that a second 
marriage should not be entered too quickly.  1 Corinthians 7 stipulated the ‘conjugal 
rights’ that husbands and wives alike could enjoy in each other’s bodies rather than 
‘burning’ with lust, and allowed parties to separate in the event of desertion by one 
spouse.  The household codes of Colossians 3, 1 Peter 2-3, and Ephesians 5-6 
governed the interactions of husbands and wives, parents and children, masters and 
servants. These codes, together with sundry New Testament injunctions against 
sexual immorality, informed a rich Protestant tradition of confessional, catechetical, 
and casuistic teachings on sex, marriage, and family life that lasted into the 20th 
century. 
While a few early Protestant groups used the Bible alone, most Protestants 
also drew heavily on the Western tradition – the marital wisdom of Aristotle, the 
Stoics, and the Church Fathers, the domestic norms of pre- and post-Christianized 
Roman law, and, before long, even some of the marital theology and law of the 
medieval Church.  Protestants accepted the traditional teaching that marriage was 
both a natural institution created by God and a contractual unit formed in its essence 
by the mutual consent of the parties. The marital contract prescribed for couples a 
life-long relation of love, service, and devotion to each other, and proscribed any 
unwarranted breach or relaxation of their connubial and parental duties. Protestants 
also accepted traditional sex crimes like adultery, concubinage, prostitution, incest, 
polygamy, sodomy, abortion, infanticide, and child abuse as violations of natural and 
biblical morality.  
Unlike medieval Catholics, however, Protestants rejected the medieval 
Church’s subordination of marriage to celibacy and its celebration of marriage as a 
sacrament.  According to common Protestant lore, the person was too tempted by 
sinful passion to forgo God's soothing remedy of marriage, and the celibate life had 
no superior virtue and was no prerequisite for ecclesiastical service. Moreover, 
Protestants did not believe marriage to be a sacrament. The marital household was, 
in their view, a social order ordained by God and equal in dignity to the church, state, 
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and other estates.  From this common foundation, Lutherans, Calvinists, and 
Anglicans each constructed their own models of sex, marriage, and family life. 
Lutheranism   
The Lutheran tradition that dominated Germany and Scandinavia from the 
16th to the 19th centuries, developed a social model of marriage, grounded in the 
two kingdoms theory of Martin Luther (1483-1546) (Ozment 2001; Dieterich 1970).  
Marriage, Luther and his colleagues taught, was a social estate of the earthly 
kingdom of creation, not a sacred estate of the heavenly kingdom of redemption.  
Though divinely ordained and biblically governed, marriage was directed to human 
ends and social ‘uses.’  Marriage revealed to persons their sin and their need for 
God's marital gift: this was its theological use.  Marriage restricted prostitution, 
promiscuity and other public sexual sins: this was its civil use. Marriage taught love, 
restraint, and other public virtues: this was its pedagogical use.   
All fit men and women were free and encouraged to marry or remarry, clerical 
and lay alike, unless they had the rare gift of continence.  We are all sinful creatures, 
Lutherans argued; lust has pervaded the conscience of everyone.  Marriage is thus 
not just an option but a necessity.  For without it, a person's distorted sexuality 
becomes a force capable of overthrowing the most devout conscience.  A person is 
enticed by nature to concubinage, prostitution, masturbation, voyeurism, and other 
sexual sins.  ‘To spurn marriage is to act against God’s calling ... and against 
nature’s urging,’ Luther wrote.  The calling of marriage should be declined only by 
those who have received God's special gift of continence.  ‘Such persons are rare, 
not one in a thousand, for they are a special miracle of God.’ (Luther [LW] 1955: 
vol.28: 912, 927-31; vol.45: 18-22).  
This understanding of marriage as a protection against sin undergirded 
Lutheran and other Protestants’ bitter attacks on the Catholic tradition of mandatory 
clerical celibacy.  To require celibacy of clerics, monks, and nuns, the reformers 
believed, was ultimately a source of great sin. Celibacy was a gift for God to give, 
not a duty for the church to impose.  It was for each individual, not for the church, to 
decide whether he or she had received this gift.  By demanding monastic vows of 
chastity and clerical vows of celibacy, the church was seen to be intruding on 
Christian freedom and contradicting Scripture, nature, and common sense.  By 
institutionalizing and encouraging celibacy the church preyed on the immature and 
the uncertain.  By holding out food, shelter, security, and economic opportunity, the 
monasteries enticed poor and needy parents to oblate their minor children to a life of 
celibacy, regardless of whether it suited their natures.  Mandatory celibacy was not a 
prerequisite to true clerical service of God.  Instead, wrote Luther, a former monk, it 
led to ‘great whoredom and all manner of fleshly impurity and . . . hearts filled with 
thoughts of women day and night.’ It was far safer that all clergy be married.  And, 
indeed, marriage would enhance a pastor’s ministry to couples and families, and his 
marital parsonage could provide a model for proper Christian domestic living.   
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Marriage not only protected humanity against sexual sin, Lutherans insisted, 
but also offered them the sublime divine gift of marital love.  Luther extolled the ‘love’ 
of husband and wife to be ‘over and above’ all other loves,’ indeed a ‘foretaste of the 
love of heaven.’ (Luther [WA] 1883-1987: vol. 2:167; see also 13:11, 17/2:350 on)  
He did not deny the traditional leadership of the paterfamilias within the marital 
household, but he also did not betray these warm sentiments to the point of 
becoming the grim prophet of patriarchy, paternalism, and procreation ϋber alles that 
some modern critics make him out to be.  For Luther, love was a necessary and 
sufficient good of marriage.  He supported marriages between loving couples, even 
those between young men and older women beyond child-bearing years or between 
couples who could not have children. He stressed repeatedly that husband and wife 
were spiritual, intellectual, and emotional ‘partners,’ each to have regard and respect 
for the strengths of the other.  He called his own wife Katharine respectfully ‘Mr. 
Kathy’ and said of her: ‘I am an inferior lord, she the superior; I am Aaron, she is my 
Moses.’ (In Ozment 2001, 36-7)  He repeatedly told husbands and wives alike to 
tend to each other’s spiritual, emotional, and sexual needs and to share household 
duties. (LW 45:39 on)   
Marriage sometimes brought the divine gift of children as well. Luther treated 
procreation as an act of co-creation and co-redemption with God.  He wished for all 
marital couples the joy of having children, not only for their own sakes but for the 
sake of God as well.  Childrearing, he wrote, ‘is the noblest and most precious work, 
because to God there can be nothing dearer than the salvation of souls . . . Most 
certainly, father and mother are apostles, bishops, [and] priests to their children, for 
it is they who make them acquainted with the Gospel.’ (LW 45:46)  Only on this sure 
foundation of parental love, nurture, and education, could the church do its proper 
catechesis and the state its public education of children. 
This Lutheran model of sex, marriage, and family life remained at the core of 
German and Scandinavian culture and law until the 19th century.  One of the richest 
distillations of Lutheran teachings on love and marriage came from Danish 
philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), whose views on love were later 
elaborated by Anders Nygren.  One of the best early legal syntheses of Lutheran 
laws on marriage and divorce came from Prussian jurist Justus Henning Böhmer 
(1674-1749), whose work remains at the heart of a burgeoning German and 
Scandinavian scholarship on Lutheran marriage law today.  
Calvinism 
The Calvinist tradition, first established in Geneva, set out a covenantal model 
of marriage. (Kingdon 1995; Köhler 1942; Seeger 1989)  Marriage, John Calvin 
(1509-1564) and his followers taught, was a public covenant modelled on the 
ancient covenant between Yahweh and Israel. A variety of parties participated in the 
formation of this marital covenant.  The marital parties themselves swore their 
betrothals and espousals before each other and God ‒ rendering all marriages 
tripartite agreements, with God as third party witness, participant, and judge.  The 
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couple's parents, as God's ‘bishops’ for children, gave their consent to the union.  
Two witnesses, as God's priests to their peers, served as witnesses to the marriage.  
The minister, holding God's spiritual power of the Word, blessed and instructed the 
couple in a mandatory church wedding.  The magistrate, holding God's temporal 
power of the sword, registered the couple and protected them in their person and 
marital property.  Each of these parties – parents, peers, ministers and magistrates ‒ 
was considered essential to the legitimacy of the marriage, for they each 
represented a different dimension of God's involvement in the covenant.  To omit 
any such party was, in effect, to omit God from the marriage covenant.  
The covenant of marriage, said Calvin, was grounded in the order of creation 
and governed by the moral law of God set out in Scripture, reason, and conscience.  
God's law set out two tracks of marital norms, Calvin taught ‒ civil norms, which are 
common to all persons, and spiritual norms, which are distinctly Christian.  This 
moral law, in turn, gave rise to two tracks of marital morality ‒ a simple morality of 
duty demanded of all persons regardless of their faith, and a higher morality of 
aspiration demanded of believers in order to reflect their faith.  The moral law not 
only coerces them against violence and violation, but also cultivates in them charity 
and love.  It not only punishes harmful acts of adultery and fornication, but also 
prohibits evil thoughts of passion and lust. It not only punishes wife abuse or child 
neglect, but also counsels a sacrificial love, tenderness, patience, and kindness 
towards a spouse and children that goes beyond that given to anyone or anything 
else.   
It was the church's responsibility to teach aspirational spiritual norms for 
marriage and family life.  It was the state's responsibility to enforce mandatory civil 
norms.  This division of responsibility was reflected in 16th-century Geneva and later 
Calvinist polities in the procedural divisions between the church consistory and the 
city council.  In family cases, the consistory was the court of first instance, and would 
call parties to their higher spiritual duties, backing their recommendations with 
instruction, admonition, confession, Eucharist bans, and in extreme cases, 
excommunication.  If such spiritual discipline failed, the parties were referred to the 
city council to compel them, using civil and criminal sanctions, to honour at least 
their basic civil duties for marriage. 
This Calvinist covenantal model mediated both contractual and sacramental 
understandings of marriage.  On the one hand, it confirmed the traditional 
contractual qualities of marriage -- without subjecting it to the personal preferences 
of the parties.  Marriage depended for its validity and utility on the voluntary consent 
of the parties.  But marriage was more than a mere contract, for God was a third 
party to every marriage covenant, and set its basic terms in the order and law of 
creation.  Freedom of contract in marriage was thus effectively limited to choosing 
maturely which party to marry ‒ with no real choice about the form, forum, or 
function of marriage once a fit and willing spouse was chosen. 
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On the other hand, this covenant model confirmed the sacred qualities of 
marriage ‒ without ascribing to it sacramental functions.  Marriage, Calvin argued, 
was a holy and loving fellowship, a compelling image of the bond between Yahweh 
and his elect, Christ and his church.  But marriage was no sacrament.  Yes, 
Ephesians 5:32 analogized the loving and sacrificial union of a Christian husband 
and wife to the ‘great mysterion’ of Christ’s union with the church, but the Bible was 
not thereby making marriage a sacrament. It was just using a striking image to drive 
home a moral lesson. The Bible did this all the time, said Calvin.  ‘Faith is like a 
mustard seed’: it grows even if tiny. ‘The kingdom of heaven is like yeast’: it leavens 
even if you can’t see it.  Or ‘the Son of man will come like a thief in the night.’  So be 
ready at all times for his return. The marriage analogy is similar: ‘Marital love is like 
the union of Christ and the church.’  So be faithful and sacrificial to your spouse, as 
Christ is to his church. (See Calvin 1960: 4.19.34; see also LW 36:97 on) 
Denying the sacramental quality of marriage had dramatic implications for 
how a marriage should be formed and dissolved in Calvinist and other Protestant 
lands.  First, there were no formal religious or baptismal tests for marriage.  To be 
sure, parties would certainly do well to marry within the faith for the sake of 
themselves and their children.  But interreligious marriage was permissible, as 
Calvin himself showed in marrying an Anabaptist widow.  Second, divorce and 
remarriage were licit, sometimes necessary.  To be sure, marriages should be stable 
and presumptively indissoluble.  But this presumption could be overcome if one of 
the essential marital goods was chronically betrayed by adultery, desertion, cruelty, 
or felony.  If the parties could not be reconciled, either the husband or wife had the 
right to divorce and remarry another.   
This covenantal model of marriage came to dominate numerous Calvinist 
communities in Switzerland, Germany, Hungary, France, the Netherlands, Scotland, 
England, and later North America.  Until well into the 19th century, both church and 
state authorities in Calvinist lands governed in copious detail marital formation, 
maintenance, and dissolution, child care, custody, and control, spousal rights, 
responsibilities, and remedies and more.  They also set stern codes of sexual ethics 
for Calvinist communities designed to curb fornication, adultery, sodomy, 
pornography, prostitution, dancing, and other sexual expression.  These firm moral 
codes formed the backbone of Puritan sexual ethics in early America and also 
animated the chastity and modesty ethics of 19th-century Victorians.  And, in the 
20th century, great theologians like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Helmut Thielieke 
worked out an intricate covenant theology of sex, marriage, and family life rooted in 
various strands of the Calvinist tradition. 
Anglicanism 
The Anglican tradition brought forth a commonwealth model of marriage. 
(Powell 1917; Carlson 1994; Ingram 1987)  This model embraced the social and 
covenantal models of marriage taught by Lutherans and Calvinists, but also went 
beyond them.  Marriage, Anglican writers argued, was at once a gracious symbol of 
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the divine, a social unit of the earthly kingdom, and a solemn covenant with one's 
spouse.  But the most essential cause, condition, and calling of the family was that it 
served and symbolized the common good of the couple, the children, the church, 
and the state all at once.  For Anglican divines like William Gouge (1578-1653), 
marriage was appointed by God as ‘a little commonwealth’ to foster the mutual love, 
service, and security of husband and wife, parent and child.  It was also designed as 
a ‘seedbed and seminary’ of the broader commonwealth of church and state to 
teach essential Christian and political norms and habits (Gouge 1622).   
Like the political and ecclesiastical commonwealths, Anglican divines argued, 
the domestic commonwealth was created as a hierarchical structure.  God had 
created Eve as ‘a help meet’ for Adam.  He had called Adam and Eve to mutual 
society among themselves and to the mutual procreation of children (Gen. 1:28, 
2:18).  After the Fall, He had commanded that Adam ‘shall rule over’ Eve (Gen. 
3:16).  As heir of Adam, the modern husband was thus the head of his wife.  As heir 
of Eve, the modern wife was his subject, his ‘help meet.’  Together husband and wife 
were the heads of their children and the rest of the household.  Each of these offices 
in the family hierarchy was bound by a series of duties, rooted in the Bible and 
natural law, which dozens of thick household manuals and catechisms of the day 
elaborated.  Faithful maintenance of domestic duties and offices, Anglican divines 
believed, was the best guarantee of individual flourishing and social order within the 
broader commonwealths of church and state.  Robert Filmer’s’ Patriarcha (c. 1642), 
gave this conservative, patriarchal rendering of the commonwealth model of 
marriage its classic formulation – and his work helped to distil and anchor both 
political theories of absolute monarchy and theological theories of absolute male 
headship within the marital household. 
Until 1640, the commonwealth model served to rationalize the traditional 
hierarchies of husband over wife, parent over child, church over household, state 
over church.  To call the marital household ‘a little commonwealth’ was to signal its 
subordinate place within the new hierarchy of social institutions that comprised ‘the 
great church and commonwealth’ of England.  It was also to call the household to an 
internal hierarchy of offices that matched the royal and episcopal offices of the great 
commonwealth – with the paterfamilias’ role of ruler within each family serving as a 
miniature model of the king as the supreme head of the church and commonwealth 
of England.  The commonwealth model was thus used to integrate a whole network 
of parallel domestic and political duties rooted in the Bible and English tradition. 
Anglican divines and moralists expounded at great length the reciprocal duties of 
husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant that would produce a well-
ordered little commonwealth.  And, in keeping with the tradition of stability of the 
great political commonwealth of England, these same Anglican writers prohibited the 
dissolution of this little domestic commonwealth of the family by divorce.   
As the political concept of the English commonwealth was revolutionized and 
democratized in the 17th century, however, so was the English commonwealth 
model of marriage.  Particularly during the English Commonwealth period of 1642-
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1660, when a coalition of Protestant revolutionaries overthrew the church and state 
establishment, these traditional domestic hierarchies were challenged with a 
revolutionary new principle of equality.  The biblical duties of husband and wife and 
of parent and child were recast as the natural rights of each household member 
against the other.  The traditional idea of a created natural order met with a new idea 
of marriage, society, and state formed voluntarily by contracts by individuals in the 
state of nature.  Just as the English commonwealth could be rent asunder by force 
of arms when it abused the people's natural rights, so the family commonwealth 
could be put asunder by suits at law when one spouse abused the other’s marital 
rights.  Just as the King could be beheaded for abuses in the Commonwealth, so the 
paterfamilias could be removed from the head of the little commonwealth for abuses 
in the household.   
Locke, Blackstone, and the Common Law Tradition 
The most famous exposition of this new democratic reading of the 
commonwealth model of marriage came from English philosopher, John Locke 
(1632-1704), who straddled the Anglican, Puritan, and early Enlightenment worlds.  
Especially in his famous Two Treatises on Government, Locke sought to refute 
Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha.  God did not create Adam and Eve as ruler and subject, 
but as husband and wife, said Locke.  Adam and Eve were created equal before 
God.  Each had natural rights to use the bounties of Paradise.  Each had natural 
duties to each other and to God.  After the fall into sin, God expelled Adam and Eve 
from the Garden.  He increased man's labour in his use of creation.  He increased 
woman's labour in the bearing of children.  But God, said Locke, did not abrogate the 
natural equality, rights, and duties with which God created Adam and Eve, and all 
persons after them.  Nor did God render all wives to be eternally subject to their 
husbands.  Men and women are born free and equal in the state of nature.   
As humans moved from the state of nature, ‘the first Society’ to be formed 
‘was between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that of Parents and Children.’  
This ‘conjugal society,’ like every other society, ‘is made by a voluntary Compact 
between Man and Woman.’  The marriage of a man and woman is ‘necessary not 
only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common offspring, 
who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to 
provide for themselves.’  For Locke, men and women have a natural and equal right 
to enter into a marital contract.   But their children also have a natural right to 
survival, support, protection and education.  This imposed on their parents the 
natural duty to remain in their marriage once contracted, at least until their children 
were emancipated. (Locke 1960: II.2, II.77-86) 
Locke’s arguments ‒ and their elaboration by other philosophers like Baron 
Montesquieu (1689-1755), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), and Mary 
Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), all childhood Protestants – were critical to the 
development of the rights of men and women, parents and children within the 
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Western legal tradition.  William Blackstone (1723-1780), the leading English 
common lawyer of the 18th century, for example argued: 
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a 
principle of natural law…. The main end and design of marriage [is] to ascertain 
and fix upon some certain person, to whom the care, the protection, the 
maintenance, and the education of the children should belong. (Blackstone 
1765: 1.16.1) 
Blackstone set out in detail the reciprocal rights and duties that the natural 
law imposes upon parents and children, and which the common law must enforce. It 
requires parents to maintain, protect, and educate their children, and in turn protects 
their rights to discharge these parental duties against undue interference by others.  
These ‘natural duties’ of parents are the correlatives of the ‘natural rights’ of their 
children to be nurtured, protected, and educated.  And, in turn, once they become 
adults, children acquire reciprocal natural duties toward their parents as they enter 
into their second childhood, and need the support, care, and protection of their 
children and other kin. (Blackstone 1765: I.15.1; 1.16.1-3)   
The common law was gradually reformed in line with these new teachings on 
marital equality and intra-familial rights.  In England, Parliament passed the famous 
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 that authorized innocent husbands and wives alike 
to sue for absolute divorce on proof of cause with a right to remarry, and empowered 
courts to place minor children in the custody of that parent who was best suited to 
care for their maintenance, nurture, and education. This and later new legislation on 
elementary education, bastardy protection, and prevention of cruelty to children, 
slowly bent the law toward the presumption that custody of a child, particularly a 
minor, be granted to the mother, and that the father be charged with support 
payments but entitled to visitation rights until the child reaches the age of majority.  
Furthermore, a series of Married Women's Property Acts after 1870 slowly 
released married women from the traditional bonds of coverture that legally 
subsumed a woman's person, property, and identity into that of her husband.  
Married women slowly gained stronger title and control over the property they 
brought into the marriage, or acquired after the wedding. They also gained 
increasing capacities to enter contracts of sale, lease, and mortgage of their 
properties, and the capacity to execute wills, trusts, and other dispositions.  These 
early reforms of marital property law eventually strengthened the pursuit of gender 
equality outside the marital home as well.  After their rights to property were 
enhanced, women were able to gain broader rights and access to higher education, 
learned societies, trade and commercial guilds and unions, and a variety of 
professions, occupations, and societies historically closed to them. On the strength 
of these achievements, women ultimately gained the right to vote and to hold public 
office in 1918. (Shanley 1987; Staves 1990) Comparable reforms in favour of 
women’s rights and children’s rights emerged in other common law lands, notably in 
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Canada, the United States, and Australia which all had comparable sweeping new 
marital and family reforms in the later 19th and early 20th centuries. 
From Protestant Confessionalism to Enlightenment Liberalism 
Protestants, on both sides of the Atlantic, continued to expound their rich 
theologies of marriage until the 20th century.  They continued to mine the Bible for 
further insights into the fundamentals of sex, marriage and family life.  While these 
Protestant theologies of marriage did change in accent and application over time 
and across denominational lines, the main Protestant teachings on marriage 
introduced in the 16th and 17th centuries did not change much before the 20th 
century.   
Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans, Anabaptists, and the hundreds of 
denominations eventually derived from these mainline groups, all generally 
expounded the same basic teaching. God had created marriage for the mutual 
comfort of men and women, their mutual procreation of children, and their mutual 
protection from sin and temptation.  All fit and able adults should marry, unless 
uniquely called to a single life.  Monogamous marriage between unrelated parties 
was the sole legitimate form and forum for sex and procreation.  Incest, polygamy, 
adultery, fornication, concubinage, prostitution, sodomy, and bestiality were all 
strictly forbidden.  Marriages should proceed first with an engagement, then with 
public banns, and finally with a church wedding.  Valid marriages required parental 
consent, peer witnesses, and civil registration with the state to complement the 
pastor’s consecration in the church.  Marital parties should support and care for each 
other throughout their lives, and provide for each other and for their children in their 
last wills and testaments.  Both fathers and mothers must share in the care, 
education, and protection of their children.  Divorce is allowed on proven grounds of 
adultery, malicious desertion, or other serious fault, with remarriage allowed at least 
to the innocent party and ongoing household support required of the guilty party. 
Natural Law Theory 
The more innovative changes in Protestant teachings theory in the 18th and 
19th centuries came at the philosophical level.  Selected Protestants in Europe and 
America allied with Enlightenment liberals to develop a fuller natural law theory that 
defended the equal rights of women and children, but also defended the traditional 
norms of enduring and exclusive monogamous marriages and no extramarital sex.  
Rather than simply adducing the Bible and Christian tradition, however, these later 
Protestant writers sought to build a natural account of these main features of 
marriage and sexual morality – using rational, empirical, and utilitarian arguments 
designed to be cogent even to those with different religious convictions. (See Waters 
2007; Yenor 2011)   
These Protestant natural law theorists used various methods to make their 
case.  Some drew increasingly sophisticated inferences from bonding patterns and 
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reproductive strategies among animals, building on Aristotelian-Thomistic insights 
and anticipating the findings of modern evolutionary biologists. (See Browning 2003)  
Some uncovered the common forms and norms of marriage that were shared by 
Greeks, Romans, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and others ‒ all of which they took 
as evidence of a common natural law at work.  Orthodox Protestant theologians 
often decried these efforts, especially as some philosophers moved toward the more 
anti-clerical, if not anti-Christian formulations of the later French Enlightenment.  But 
most Protestant natural law theorists on marriage saw their efforts as a complement 
to, even a confirmation of, the work of the Christian tradition.    
The writings of Henry Home, known as Lord Kames of Scotland (1696-1782), 
are a good illustration.  A leading man of letters and a leading justice of the Scottish 
highest court, Home was a friend of Frances Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, 
and other Scottish Enlightenment luminaries. He was best known for his brilliant 
defence of natural law, principally on empirical and rational grounds which were 
designed to give it more universal and enduring cogency.  A devout and life-long 
Protestant, Home believed in the truth of Scripture and the will of God.  But he 
wanted to win over even sceptics and atheists to his legal and moral arguments and 
to give enduring ‘authority to the promises and covenants’ that helped create society 
and its institutions. (Home 2005: 1.2)  
Among many other institutions and ‘covenants,’ Home defended 
monogamous marriage as a ‘necessity of nature,’ and he denounced polygamy and 
non-marital sex as ‘a vice against human nature.’  He recognized that polygamy had 
been practiced in early Western history and was still known in some Islamic and 
Asiatic cultures in his day.  But, Home insisted, polygamy exists only ‘where women 
are treated as inferior beings,’ and where ‘men of wealth’ buy their wives like slaves 
and adopt the ‘savage manners’ of animals.  Among horses, cattle, and other 
grazing animals, he argued, polygamy is natural.  One superior male breeds with all 
females, and the mothers take care of their own young who grow quickly 
independent.  For these animals, monogamous ‘pairing would be of no use: the 
female feeds herself and her young at the same instant; and nothing is left for the 
male to do.’  But other animals, such as nesting birds, ‘whose young require the 
nursing care of both parents, are directed by nature to pair’ and to remain paired till 
their young ‘are sufficiently vigorous to provide for themselves.’ (Home 2007: Book 
1, Sketches VI-VI; Book III, Sketch III) 
Humans are the latter sort of creature, said Home, for whom pairing and 
parenting are indispensable.  Humans are thus inclined by nature toward enduring 
monogamous pairing of parents – indeed, more so than any other creature given the 
long fragility and helplessness of human offspring: 
Man is an animal of long life, and is proportionally slow in growing to 
maturity: he is a helpless being before the age of fifteen or sixteen; and there may 
be in a family ten or twelve children of different births, before the eldest can shift 
for itself. Now in the original state of hunting and fishing, which are laborious 
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occupations, and not always successful, a woman, suckling her infant, is not able 
to provide food even for herself, far less for ten or twelve voracious children….  
[P]airing is so necessary to the human race, that it must be natural and 
instinctive…. Brute animals, which do not pair, have grass and other food in 
plenty, enabling the female to feed her young without needing any assistance 
from the male. But where the young require the nursing care of both parents, 
pairing is a law of nature. (Home 2007: Book 1, Sketch 6) 
Not only is the pairing of male and female a law of nature, Home continued.  
‘Matrimony is instituted by nature’ to overcome humans’ greatest natural handicap to 
effective procreation and preservation as a species ‒ their perpetual desire for sex, 
especially among the young, at exactly the time when they are most fertile.  Unlike 
most animals, whose sexual appetites are confined to short rutting seasons, Home 
wrote, humans have a constant sexual appetite which, by nature, ‘demands 
gratification, after short intervals.’  If men and women just had random sex with 
anyone -- ‘like the hart in rutting time’ -- the human race would devolve into a 
‘savage state of nature’ and soon die out.  Men would make perennial and 
‘promiscuous use of women’ and not commit themselves to the care of these women 
or their children.  ‘Women would in effect be common prostitutes.’  Few women 
would have the ability on their own ‘to provide food for a family of children,’ and most 
would avoid having children or would abandon them if they did. (Home 2007: Book 
1, Sketches VI-VI)   
Monogamous marriage is nature’s safeguard against such proclivities, said 
Home, and ‘frequent enjoyment’ of marital sex and intimacy ‘endears a pair to each 
other,’ making them want only each other all the more.  ‘Sweet is the society of a 
pair fitted for each other, in whom are collected the affections of husband, wife, 
lover, friend, the tenderest affections of human nature.’  
The God of nature has [thus] enforced conjugal society, not only by making it 
agreeable, but by the principle of chastity inherent in our nature…. Chastity is 
essential even to the continuation of the human race. As the carnal appetite is 
always alive, the sexes would wallow in pleasure, and be soon rendered unfit 
for procreation, were it not for the restraint of chastity. (Home 2007: Book 1, 
Sketch VI)  
Hume and Paley 
Similarly, the famous Scottish philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776), for all 
his scepticism about traditional morality and Christianity, thought traditional legal and 
moral norms of sex, marriage, and family life to be both natural and useful.  Hume 
summarized the natural configuration of human marriage crisply: ‘The long and 
helpless infancy requires the combination of parents for the subsistence of their 
young; and that combination requires the virtue of chastity and fidelity to the 
marriage bed.’ (Hume 1963: 206-207) Like Home, Hume denounced polygamy.  
This ‘odious institution’ denied the natural equality of the sexes.  It fostered ‘the bad 
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education of children.’  It led to ‘jealousy and competition among wives,’ and more.  
Moreover, said Hume, polygamy forced a man, distracted by his other wives and 
children, to confine his other wives to the home – by physically threatening, binding, 
or even laming them, by isolating them from society, or by keeping them so poor and 
weak they could not leave.  All this is a form of ‘barbarism,’ with ‘frightful effects’ that 
defy all nature and reason. (Hume 1987: 182-187)   
Hume offered similar arguments against ‘voluntary divorce’ – no-fault, 
unilateral divorce, as we now call it.  Many in Hume’s day argued for divorce as a 
natural expression of the freedom of contract and a natural compensation for having 
no recourse to polygamy despite a man’s natural drive to multiple partners.  Hume 
would have none of this.  To be sure, he recognized that divorce was sometimes the 
better of two evils – especially where one party was guilty of adultery, severe cruelty, 
or malicious desertion, and especially when no children were involved.  But, outside 
of such narrow circumstances, he said, ‘nature has made divorce’ without real cause 
the ‘doom of all mortals.’  First, with voluntary divorce, the children suffer and 
become ‘miserable.’  Shuffled from home to home, consigned to the care of 
strangers and step-parents ‘instead of the fond attention and concern of a parent,’ 
the inconveniences and encumbrances of their lives just multiply as the divorces of 
their parents and stepparents multiply.  Second, when voluntary divorce is 
foreclosed, couples by nature become disinclined to wander, and instead form ‘a 
calm and sedate affection, conducted by reason and cemented by habit; springing 
from long acquaintance and mutual obligations, without jealousies or fears.’  ‘We 
need not, therefore, be afraid of drawing the marriage-knot, which chiefly subsists by 
friendship, the closest possible.’  Third, ‘nothing is more dangerous than to unite two 
persons so closely in all their interests and concerns, as man and wife, without 
rendering the union entire and total.  The least possibility of a separate interest must 
be the source of endless quarrels and suspicions.’  Nature, justice and prudence 
alike require their ‘continued consortium.’ (Hume 1987: 187-190)   
William Paley (1743-1805), a Cambridge philosopher and Anglican cleric, 
added a utilitarian argument against fornication –‘sex or cohabitation without 
marriage.’  Even though some humans by nature are inclined to wander, Paley 
argued, society must forbid fornication because it ‘discourages marriage’ and 
‘diminishes the private and public goods’ that marriage offers.  The male part of the 
species, Paley wrote, will not undertake the encumbrance, expense, and restraint of 
married life, if they can gratify their passions at a cheaper price; and they will 
undertake anything rather than not gratify them.’ (Paley 2002: 3.3.2)  Paley 
recognized that he was appealing to general utility, but he thought an absolute ban 
on fornication was the only way to avoid the slippery slope to utter sexual libertinism: 
The libertine may not be conscious that these irregularities hinder his own 
marriage . . . much less does he perceive how his indulgences can hinder other 
men from marrying; but what will he say would be the consequence, if the 
same licentiousness were universal? or what should hinder its becoming 
universal, if it be innocent or allowable in him?’ (Paley 2002: 3.3.2) 
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Fornication furthermore leads to prostitution, Paley went on, with its 
accompanying degradation of women, erosion of morals, transmission of disease, 
production of unwanted and uncared for children, and further irregularities and 
pathos.  Fornication also leads naturally to a tradition of concubinage -- ‘the kept 
mistress,’ who can be dismissed at the man’s pleasure, or retained ‘in a state of 
humiliation and dependence inconsistent with the rights which marriage would 
confer upon her’ and her children.  No small wonder that the Bible condemned 
fornication, prostitution, concubinage, and other such ‘cohabitation without marriage’ 
in no uncertain terms, said Paley.  But, again, in these injunctions the Bible is simply 
reflecting the natural order and common moral sense. 
Adultery is even worse than fornication, said Paley, because it not only insults 
the goods of marriage in the abstract.  It injures an actual good marriage, leaving the 
innocent spouse as well as their children as victims.  For the betrayed spouse, 
adultery is ‘a wound in his [or her] sensibility and affections, the most painful and 
incurable that human nature knows.’  For the children it brings shame and 
unhappiness as the vice is inevitably detected and discussed.  For the adulterer or 
adulteress, it is a form of ‘perjury’ that violates their marital vow and covenant.  For 
all parties in the household, adultery will often provoke retaliation and imitation – 
another slippery slope to erosion of marriage and the unleashing of sexual 
libertinism and seduction.  Both nature and Scripture thus rain down anathemas 
against it. (Paley 2002: 3.3.2)  Paley’s utilitarian arguments in favour of traditional 
understandings of sex, marriage, and family life would find enduring provenance 
among many utilitarians into the 19th century, including the most famous of them, 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).  
Locke, Home, Hume, and Paley were only a few of the scores of Western 
writers from the 17th to the 19th centuries who defended traditional Western norms 
of sex, marriage, and family using this surfeit of arguments from nature, reason, 
fairness, prudence, utility, pragmatism, and common sense.  Some of these writers 
were inspired, no doubt, by their personal Protestant faith, others by a conservative 
desire to maintain the status quo.  But most of these writers pressed their principal 
arguments on non-biblical grounds.  And they were sometimes sharply critical of the 
Bible – denouncing St. Paul’s preferences for celibacy, the Mosaic provisions on 
unilateral male divorce, and the many tales of polygamy, concubinage, and 
prostitution among the ancient biblical patriarchs and kings.  Moreover, most of 
these writers jettisoned many other features of the Western tradition that, in their 
judgment, defied reason, fairness, and utility – including, notably, the establishment 
of Christianity by law and the political privileging of the church.  Their natural law 
theory of the family was not just a rationalist apologia for traditional Christian family 
values or a naturalist smokescreen for personal religious beliefs.  They defended 
traditional family norms not out of confessional faith but out of rational proof, not just 
because they uncritically believed in them but because they worked.   
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Later Enlightenment Reforms 
The key move made by the early (often Protestant) Enlightenment 
philosophers was to remove the necessary religious dimension of sex and marriage.  
This liberalized the marital household somewhat, and gave parties the choice 
whether to involve the church or to obey the Bible in their sex, marriage, and family 
lives.  But the early Enlightenment philosophers left in place the idea that marriage 
was at once a natural, social, and contractual association, with a number of its basic 
terms pre-set by nature and society in order to protect the natural rights and duties 
of husbands and wives, parents and children.  They also left in place traditional 
prohibitions on no-fault divorce, extramarital sex, and other sex crimes in order to 
protect the rights of women and children.  
The key move made by liberal philosophers in the 20th and early 21st century 
was to gradually remove the necessary natural and social dimensions of marriage as 
well.  This liberalized the institution of marriage even more, reducing it to a private 
contract between a man and a woman who had reached the age of consent.  These 
parties were now free to enter, exercise, and exit their marriage contract without 
interference from church, state, or society.  They were free to renegotiate the terms 
of their marital contract.  And they were free to live in various intimate relationships 
without any contracts at all.  This posed dramatic new challenges to contemporary 
Protestants.  Western Protestants have thus joined Catholics and others in a new 
modern marriage movement designed to protect and privilege the marital household, 
even while protecting personal liberty (Thatcher 1999).   
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